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The Military in Papua New Guinea:  
A ‘Culture of Instability’ But No Coup 
Ron J. May and Nicole Haley 
In the lead-up to independence, there was debate in Papua New Guinea as to whether a 
defence force would safeguard national security or pose a threat to democracy.  In the event, 
the Defence force was retained and has played a significant role in maintaining internal security 
and contributing to national development, as well as securing the country’s borders.  But there 
has been some deterioration since independence in the capacity and morale of the PNGDF, 
and several instances of tension between the military and the government, especially during the 
Bougainville conflict.  Civil-military relations since independence are briefly traced and the 
question of why Papua New Guinea has not experienced a military coup is addressed. 
In the lead-up to independence in Papua New Guinea (PNG) in 1975, there 
was extensive debate about whether the post-independent state should have 
a defence force.  Several of PNG’s emerging leaders saw the existence of a 
well-trained cohesive defence force—what one Member of Parliament (MP) 
referred to as “a sort of super-tribe”
1
—as a potential threat to democratic 
government.  Australian journalist Peter Hastings referred to the 
“inescapable similarity between Africa and Papua New Guinea” and warned 
that after independence “the Army will inevitably be involved in the political 
direction of the country”.
2
  Notwithstanding these forebodings, in 1974 the 
Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) recommended that PNG retain its 
Defence Force, and the following year Brigadier-General Ted Diro was 
appointed as the first Papua New Guinean commander of the Papua New 
Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF).   
Remarkably perhaps, considering the record of post-colonial states in Africa, 
Asia and even the Pacific, nearly forty years since independence PNG has 
remained ‘coup-less’—despite occasional rumours of imminent coups and 
‘incidents’ involving tensions between government and the military.  This 
article examines the record of civil-military relations in PNG since 
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independence and makes a tentative attempt to account for the lack of a 
coup. 
Civil-Military Relations in the First Two Decades 
Under the Australian colonial administration, a Pacific Islands Regiment, 
created during the Pacific War, was re-formed in 1951 and by 1973 had 
evolved into the PNGDF, with a growing number of Papua New Guinean 
officers.  In recommending that an independent PNG retain its Defence 
Force, the CPC argued that the Defence Force should be “firmly oriented 
towards external defence” and expressed “very serious reservations” about 
the use of the defence force in internal security operations.
3
  The CPC’s 
recommendations were broadly endorsed by the parliament and written into 
the constitution.  Section 201 lays down the supremacy of the civilian 
authority, providing for the superintendence and control of the force by the 
National Executive Council (NEC) through the minister responsible for the 
defence force (who may not be a serving member of the force), and Section 
204 provides that the military can be called out only by the head of state (the 
governor general) acting on the advice of the NEC and in accordance with a 
request by the civilian authority embodied in an act of parliament.   
Initially the PNGDF, which had a posted strength of 3,614 in 1975, 
maintained a fairly low profile—apart from its much celebrated intervention in 
Vanuatu in 1980 to put down a separatist rebellion in the newly-independent 
neighbouring Melanesian state—and concerns about the military’s 
intervention in politics dissipated.  Indeed there were increasing calls for the 
PNGDF to play a role in internal security operations.
4
  In 1984 Army 
personnel were called out to assist police in an operation which lasted for 
about four months, following the declaration of a state of emergency in 
response to rising urban crime and violence in the national capital, Port 
Moresby.  Further call-outs to assist police occurred in 1985, 1987 and 1988.  
In 1988 the PNGDF became involved in its most serious undertaking, 
attempting, with police, to address the emerging security situation in 
Bougainville, where a group of disgruntled landowners had backed up 
demands for increased compensation from the Bougainville gold and copper 
mine with attacks on the mine and mineworkers.
5
  The commitment of the 
PNGDF to the Bougainville conflict substantially reduced its capacity for 
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security operations elsewhere in the country, although troops were deployed 
to assist police in Morobe Province in 1991 and in the national election of 
1992.   
The involvement of the PNGDF in internal security operations in this period 
inevitably brought defence personnel face to face with the actuality of 
political decision making, and it was not long before strains appeared in 
relations between the military and the government and there were 
suggestions of politicisation of the PNGDF command.  Despite the fact that 
the young men selected for early officer training came from much the same 
social and educational background as most of their counterparts in the civil 
service and, to a large extent, in the national parliament, relations between 
senior military officers on the one hand, and politicians and public servants 
on the other hand, were not particularly close.  Indeed, in his history of the 
PNGDF Sinclair describes relations in the early 1970s as “frosty”.
6
  This may 
have been a product of the military ethos inherited from the colonial period 
and the nature of the military training:   
Politicians tended to see the military as elitist and a possible threat to civilian 
rule, and the military had misgivings about politicians who questioned the 
future role of the PNGDF and suggested that it might be too big.
7
 
Tensions in relations between members of the government and senior 
PNGDF officers came to a head as early as 1977.  In August, PNGDF 
Commander Ted Diro had held discussions with a leader from the West 
Papuan (Indonesian) separatist Organisasi Papua Merdeka.  Although Diro 
claimed that the defence minister had been fully briefed on the talks, there 
was feeling within the government that Diro had exceeded his authority, and 
he was issued with an official reprimand.  Diro, however, was supported by 
his senior officers, and there were rumours in Port Moresby of a possible 
coup.
8
  At the time Diro told the NEC: 
I have now been able to assess who my friends are and who aren’t … Mr 
Prime Minister, I want you to know that the force is becoming sick to death 
of being made a political football by certain politicians and ex-politicians.
9
 
Although the incident was described at the time as “the most serious threat 
to the authority of the government since independence”,
10
 it appeared to 
blow over fairly quietly.   
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Six years later, however, a former PNGDF officer told an ABC correspondent 
that had Diro been sacked in 1977, PNGDF officers would have staged an 
already-rehearsed operation, code-named ‘Electric Shock’, in which the 
prime minister and certain other politicians and public servants would have 
been taken hostage, and that PNGDF officers had been in contact with the 
Indonesian Government during this period.  Diro’s role in all this was unclear 
and the story was denied in some quarters, but it raised concerns that 
military intervention was not out of the question.
11
 
Four years later, in 1981, Diro announced that he was resigning from the 
PNGDF to contest the 1982 national election.  He stood as leader of a 
(mostly Papuan) PNG Independent Group and was elected to parliament.  In 
the process of coalition formation, Diro was at one stage tipped as possible 
prime minister, but he ended up in opposition, briefly accepting leadership of 
the National Party, and becoming minister for forests.
12
   
Diro was not the first, nor the last, senior PNGDF officer to shift from the 
military to politics.  Diro’s early rival for the position of PNGDF commander, 
Patterson Lowa, resigned in 1975.  He joined Prime Minister Somare’s office 
and subsequently contested the national election in 1977 as a Pangu Pati 
candidate in Port Moresby.  He was elected and became minister for police; 
there were subsequent rumours that he used his position to move for the 
sacking of both General Diro and the police commissioner (whose tenure 
was terminated in 1977).
13
  Lowa lost his seat later in 1977 as a result of a 
challenge to his residential qualifications.  He subsequently became national 
organiser of the Melanesian Alliance party and was re-elected to parliament 
in 1987.  The third of the three young officers groomed for leadership of the 
PNGDF, Ken Noga, also resigned to contest the 1977 election as a pro-
Pangu candidate, but rejoined the force when he failed to gain office.  Other 
PNGDF officers have also contested national elections over the years, some 
successfully, some unsuccessfully.
14
 
With Diro’s resignation from the PNGDF, it was generally expected that he 
would be succeeded by Colonel Noga.  Instead, the position was given to 
Colonel Gago Mamae.  In 1980 a split in the ruling Pangu-led coalition and a 
subsequent vote of no confidence against Somare had a brought a new 
coalition to power, headed by People’s Progress Party (PPP) leader Sir 
Julius Chan.  There were suggestions that Mamae had been appointed over 
Noga in 1981 for political reasons (specifically, Noga’s membership of the 
Somare-led Pangu Pati).  The suggestion that political considerations had 
entered into the selection of the PNGDF command was reinforced in 1983 
when, having been re-elected to office in the national election of the previous 
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year, the Somare Government appointed Noga to replace Mamae.  (Mamae 
later resigned from the PNGDF and became executive officer in Chan’s PPP 
office, standing unsuccessfully as a PPP candidate in the 1987 election.) 
The politicisation of senior PNGDF appointments was demonstrated even 
more blatantly in late 1985, when another vote of no confidence against 
Somare brought to office a government headed by Paias Wingti and Chan.  
Noga was replaced by Colonel Tony Huai.  Huai had been in consideration 
for the top position in 1982.  In 1984 he had resigned, criticising the Somare 
Government’s handling of the PNGDF.  He initially joined Mamae in Chan’s 
PPP office and indicated his intention of standing for parliament in 1987.  
The appointment of a commander from outside the PNGDF was reportedly 
opposed by the Defence Department and resented by some senior officers.  
Huai proved to be a controversial figure as PNGDF commander and he was 
dismissed two years later.  His replacement, Colonel Rochus Lokinap, was, 
coincidentally, from Chan’s New Ireland electorate and the defence minister 
at the time, James Pokasui, a former officer in the PNGDF’s Maritime 
Element, had served under him.
15
 
In 1987 Diro was re-elected and became deputy prime minister in a coalition 
government headed by Wingti.  However, accused of involvement in illicit 
transactions as minister for forests and of receiving undeclared funds from 
Indonesia’s defence and security minister General Benny Murdani for his 
1987 election campaign, and facing prosecution, Diro resigned from cabinet.  
In a parting statement to the press he said, ominously: 
the events of the past couple of months have had implications leading to 
rumours of disobedience in the disciplined forces … I have been one of the 
experts on military coups through the world [and] the ingredients are here 
for a coup … I do not want to be blamed when that arises.
16
 
In the wake of the unexpected military coups in Fiji in 1987, such comments 
were not taken lightly.  With rumours circulating in Port Moresby about an 
impending coup,
17
 three colonels—all, like Diro, from Papua—were 
“redeployed within the Public Service”, although possible links between their 
“redeployment” and the talk of a coup were never made clear.
18
 
Shortly after resigning from cabinet, Diro shifted the allegiance of the 
predominantly-Papuan party of which he was parliamentary leader, 
precipitating a change of government and returning to the position of deputy 
prime minister.  The new government reinstated the three Papuan colonels.  
But in late 1991 Diro was found guilty of misconduct by a Leadership 
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Tribunal and lost his seat.  Another reshuffle of senior PNGDF positions 
followed.  Problems remained, however, and in early 1993 it was announced 
that the defence secretary was to be sacked following clashes between the 
secretary and the minister and Brigadier-General Dademo over alleged 
interference in the PNGDF’s operations in Bougainville.
19
 
Meanwhile, there were other confrontations between the PNGDF and the 
government.  In 1988 the PNGDF mounted an operation to secure Lae City 
airport in defiance of a government decision to shift the Air Element’s base 
from Lae City, and in 1989 some 100-200 soldiers marched on the National 
Parliament, smashing windows and overturning cars, in protest against lower 
than expected pay increases.  In 1989 a Defence General Board of Inquiry 
reported a serious lack in discipline, some misuse of funds and equipment, 
and low morale.
20
   
The Bougainville Campaign and ‘Sandline Affair’ 
With some exceptions, the PNGDF’s participation with police in law and 
order operations between 1984 and 1988 had been generally regarded as 
successful.  Its performance in Bougainville, however, following deployment 
there in 1989, quickly revealed problems in its capacity to operate effectively 
against the Bougainville rebels,
21
 and in its relations with the government.  
From an early stage in the Bougainville conflict, tensions arose between the 
government, which saw a need for a negotiated settlement with aggrieved 
landowners, and the disciplined forces—police and military—subsequently 
backed in parliament by hardliners led by Diro, who believed the situation 
could be resolved by firm military action against the rebels.  In March 1989 
Police Commissioner Paul Tohian reportedly complained of “political 
interference with essential police work and political indecision” and 
threatened to defy government directives in his attempts to capture rebel 
leader Francis Ona.  Shortly after this, the acting PNGDF chief of staff, 
Colonel Leo Nuia, publicly rebuked the defence minister, saying he “should 
refrain from making wild statements on matters affecting the operations of 
the soldiers and police” on Bougainville.
22
   
Twelve months later, following negotiation of a ceasefire and withdrawal of 
troops, Tohian ordered the removal of all police from Bougainville, leaving 
the island virtually in the hands of the rebel Bougainville Revolutionary Army 
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(BRA);
23
 a visiting Australian parliamentary committee described the 
situation as “a fairly serious breakdown in the control by the Papua New 
Guinea Government of its force” and bound to lead to chaos.
24
  Shortly after, 
on his way home from an informal reception in Port Moresby for soldiers 
returning from Bougainville, a reportedly inebriated Tohian called over his 
car radio for police and army personnel to arm themselves and join him at 
the prime minister’s residence, where they were to arrest the prime minister 
and take over the government.  Tohian and two of his officers were arrested 
and initially charged with treason, but the incident—widely referred to as ‘the 
barbecoup’—was not taken altogether seriously, and charges were 
subsequently dropped.  (In 1992 Tohian was elected to the National 
Parliament and became minister for defence.)
25
 
As the Bougainville conflict dragged on, strains in the civil-military 
relationship were clearly evident.  In April 1991, following peace talks 
between the BRA and the government which resulted in a joint commitment 
to resolution of the conflict as set out in the Honiara Declaration, a group of 
soldiers under the command of hardline Colonel Nuia made an unauthorised 
landing on north Bougainville.  They launched an attack on the BRA, which 
clearly violated the Declaration and jeopardised the peace process.  In June 
1991 Nuia was dismissed (subsequently he was reinstated, dismissed again 
in 1996, and later reinstated as PNGDF commander).  Bougainvillean 
minister for provincial affairs John Momis supported the action against Nuia, 
saying, “If we don’t put a stop to it, we cannot stop a coup”.
26
  But Nuia’s 
removal did not stop the PNGDF from defying the government in blocking 
access to Bougainville, conducting raids across the border into Solomon 
Islands, and in 1996 being involved in the murder of the premier of the 
Bougainville Transitional Government established in the previous year.
27
 
In 1996, with promising peace initiatives having failed to yield results, a 
major military offensive against the BRA having achieved little, and a 
national election imminent, Prime Minister Chan was persuaded to accede to 
a covert contract with military consultants Sandline International.  This 
involved Sandline personnel and the PNGDF in an operation (‘Project 
Contravene’) designed to defeat the BRA and recapture the Bougainville 
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mine.
28
  The then-PNGDF commander, Jerry Singirok (who had previously 
commanded the force in Bougainville and became commander in 1995) 
initially went along with the proposal, but by January 1997 was having 
misgivings about the political impact of such a military operation, and about 
putting PNGDF personnel under the command of foreign mercenaries.
29
   
In February 1997 the details of Project Contravene became public.  The use 
of mercenaries, and the dubious financial arrangements for funding the 
project, promptly came under widespread condemnation both in PNG and 
overseas.  Then on 16 March 1997, under Singirok’s direction, a group of 
PNGDF soldiers detained Sandline personnel in Port Moresby and Wewak, 
in an operation codenamed ‘Rausim Kwik’.  Singirok, having briefed PNGDF 
officers, the police commissioner and the governor general, read a statement 
over national radio raising his concerns about the Sandline contract and 
calling on Prime Minister Chan, Deputy Prime Minister Chris Haiveta and 
Defence Minister Mathias Ijape to resign.  The police commissioner initially 
disassociated himself and the police from Singirok’s actions.  Chan rejected 
the call for his resignation, and Singirok—whom Chan accused of “gross 
insubordination bordering on treason”—was dismissed and later charged 
with sedition.
30
   
With mounting popular support for his actions, and some unruly 
demonstrations and looting in Moresby and several provincial capitals, 
Singirok and Major Walter Enuma, whom Singirok had appointed to carry out 
Operation Rausim Kwik, sought to diffuse the tensions.  They called on 
soldiers to remain within the barracks, but most businesses and government 
offices in Port Moresby remained closed.   
On 20 March 1997 Prime Minister Chan agreed to set up a judicial inquiry 
into the Sandline engagement, and with angry crowds surrounding the 
parliament building, Chan, Haiveta and Ijape took the advice of a group of 
prominent citizens to ‘step aside’ while the inquiry was conducted; an acting 
prime minister was appointed.  Two weeks later Enuma declared that 
Operation Rausim Kwik had ended.   
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The report of the inquiry was submitted to the acting prime minister at the 
end of May 1997 and, claiming that the report cleared him of any 
wrongdoing, Chan resumed office.  The same day he announced the 
appointment of Leo Nuia as commander PNGDF, apparently overlooking the 
fact that Nuia had been decommissioned in 1996 on the order of Singirok.  
Early in July, in one its final acts, the Chan Government re-enlisted Nuia, 
promoted him to brigadier-general, and made him commander; at the same 
time Singirok was formally decommissioned.  Nuia’s appointment was not a 
popular one within the PNGDF, and after the Sandline Affair divisions within 
the force, partly associated with the events of 1997, persisted for some 
time.
31
 
Meanwhile, in mid-1997 polling took place in the country’s fifth national 
election.  Chan was defeated in his New Ireland electorate—the first sitting 
prime minister to lose his seat; Ijape also lost, though Haiveta retained his 
seat.  Bill Skate emerged as the new prime minister and Haiveta became his 
deputy. 
In the latter days of the election campaign, it was reported that Enuma and 
several soldiers involved in Operation Rausim Kwik had provided support for 
selected candidates in the highlands, and that sixteen soldiers had been 
arrested.  Nuia ordered the arrest of Enuma and his troops to face charges 
under the Defence Force Act, but soldiers loyal to Enuma forcibly released 
him from police cells in Port Moresby and went on to briefly place Nuia under 
house arrest in Murray Barracks.  After tense negotiations, Prime Minister 
Skate controversially ordered police to suspend all charges against military 
personnel and members of non-governmental organisations arising from 
actions against the Sandline contract.  However, Enuma and four of his 
officers (including Captain Belden Namah) were charged with mutiny, and 
subsequently served gaol sentences.   
At the time of the Sandline Affair, questions were raised (mostly by the 
foreign media) as to whether Singirok’s actions constituted a coup.  
Addressing this question, one of the authors suggested that  
Operation Rausim Kwik …. involved no attempt to detain political leaders or 
occupy the Parliament, nor any attempt to seize radio or TV stations or 
influence the press [and] when dismissed Singirok accepted his dismissal to 
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describe [the Sandline Affair] as a ‘coup’ would be to stretch that term well 
beyond its normal usage.
32
 
A ‘Culture of Instability’? 
In 1998, claiming that he could no longer work with Nuia, Prime Minister 
Skate reinstated Singirok as commander, giving rise to mixed reactions from 
within the PNGDF.
33
  With Skate facing a parliamentary vote of no 
confidence, there were rumours in Port Moresby in late 1998 that he had 
reappointed Singirok to strengthen his hand, and that a military coup was 
possible.  It was claimed that the Special Forces Unit established by Singirok 
had been reconstituted and was training outside Port Moresby.  The threat of 
a vote of no confidence was averted when Skate adjourned the parliament 
for six months and by early 1999 fears of a coup had subsided. 
On his reappointment, Singirok promised “a massive clean-up” to restore 
standards and improve conditions for personnel, and to refocus on the 
PNGDF’s role in civic action and nation building.  Six senior colonels who 
had opposed Singirok in 1997 were sacked, and several other officers 
promoted, and a programme of reconciliation and confidence building was 
initiated.  A new emphasis on sovereignty protection and defence of national 
interest, contributing to regional and collective security, and nation-building 
and development was affirmed in a Defence White Paper accepted by the 
NEC in May 1999.
34
   
Singirok was replaced by a new government in 1999 and there have since 
been four PNGDF commanders, the most recent being Colonel Gilbert 
Toropo, appointed in January 2014.  Toropo is the first highlander to be 
appointed commander.  Under successive commanders the process of 
rebuilding and modernising the PNGDF has continued, though not without 
further evidence of civil-military tensions. 
In September 1999 troops on Bougainville threatened to withdraw in protest 
against poor food (due largely to non-payment of local suppliers) and non-
payment of salaries and allowances, and in early 2000 a group of PNGDF 
personnel staged an angry protest outside Defence headquarters in Port 
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Moresby demanding a substantial pay rise.  In September that year troops at 
Moem Barracks in Wewak went on a rampage over poor conditions, burning 
down the regimental headquarters and officers’ mess.  In a separate incident 
the following week, soldiers marched on Port Moresby Hospital after a 
colleague had been shot by police following an armed hold-up; rocks were 
thrown and a police vehicle set alight, and rumours that soldiers were about 
to march on the National Parliament resulted in the parliament postponing its 
session. 
The incidents of September 2000 prompted the creation of a parliamentary 
Ministerial Task Force on Defence, whose report, tabled in October 2000, 
suggested that the basic needs of the PNGDF were not being met, that basic 
management structures and systems were not appropriate or not working, 
and that critical issues relating to the mission and purpose, capacity, 
resourcing and structure of the force needed to be reviewed.  In introducing 
the report in parliament, Prime Minister Morauta spoke of a “culture of 
instability” within the PNGDF (between March 1997 and October 2001 the 
PNGDF had had seven commanders or acting commanders) and suggested 
that the institutional breakdown of the Force was the result of years of 
neglect and mismanagement.  The following month a Commonwealth 
Eminent Persons Group (CEPG) began a review of the PNGDF. 
The CEPG report was presented in January 2001.  It recommended a 
dramatic reduction in force size, from 4,150 to 1,900 within six months.
35
  
While the recommendation of cutting force size was not new, it generated an 
angry response.  Within Murray Barracks a group of around 100 soldiers 
called on the government to reject the CEPG’s recommendations and to 
resign, and there were reports of soldiers breaking into the armoury.  In the 
event, the dispute was resolved when cabinet rescinded the decision to 
reduce force size and granted amnesty to those involved in what was in 
effect another mutiny.  Less than a year later, however, rebellious soldiers in 
Wewak, in a further protest about the proposed restructuring, took control of 
Moem Barracks, burning down the communications centre and an 
administration block and chasing some officers and their families out of the 
compound.  A petition presented by the soldiers called for the resignation of 
the prime minister and the PNGDF commander, as well as addressing 
industrial issues and making a number of political demands (the latter 
including a halt to the privatisation of public assets and proposed reforms to 
land titles aimed at mobilising land for private investment).  An editorial in 
The National newspaper warned: “Moem mutiny threatens our democracy … 
the main aim of the rebellious soldiers is the political overthrow of the elected 
government of the day”.
36
  After a PNGDF crisis management team failed to 
negotiate a resolution of the dispute with the soldiers, the barracks was 
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retaken in a military operation and around thirty soldiers were arrested to 
face court-martial and civil criminal charges.   
On the eve of the 2002 national election a new defence minister was 
appointed and changes in senior PNGDF positions were announced.  A 
Defence Intelligence report suggested that this reshuffling was “election-
related” and it was widely rumoured amongst PNGDF personnel and in his 
home electorate that the new defence minister utilised the PNGDF’s Air 
Transport Wing to collect a shipment of weapons from Jayapura which were 
subsequently used to arm his personal militia.   
A Period of Relative Tranquillity 
With the emergence of a new government, led by Sir Michael Somare, after 
the 2002 election, with a new commander (Commodore Peter Ilau, 
appointed in 2001), and with the withdrawal of the PNGDF from Bougainville 
following the signing of a Bougainville Peace Agreement the same year, 
civil-military relations entered a period of relative tranquillity.   
This was slightly disrupted by the so-called Moti Affair.  In 2006 a dispute 
between Australia and the Solomon Islands Government spread to PNG 
when the Australian Government sought to block the appointment of Fijian-
born Australian citizen Julian Moti as Solomon Islands attorney general, by 
reviving allegations of a criminal offence by Moti in Vanuatu in 1997 and 
seeking Moti’s extradition to Australia.  While in transit in PNG in September 
2006, Moti was arrested at the request of the Australian Federal Police, 
released on bail, and secretly flown out of Moresby on a PNGDF aircraft to a 
small airfield in Solomon Islands.  A Defence Board of Inquiry subsequently 
found that a number of laws and regulations had been violated by the 
removal of Moti, but was unable to establish who had authorised the flight, 
with contradictory evidence implicating a number of people, from the prime 
minister down.  The chief secretary, the acting police commissioner and 
Commodore Ilau and his chief of staff were all briefly suspended, leading to 
rumours of a potential mutiny if Commodore Ilau were sacked.  Investigation 
of the funding of the operation also uncovered a record of gross financial 
mismanagement, fraud, nepotism and intimidation within the Defence 
Department.  But eventually the affair blew over with little lasting impact.
37
 
The relative tranquillity of the period 2002-2010 may have been linked to 
stability in government at that time.  In 2007 the Somare Government 
became the first post-independence government to survive a full five-year 
term in office.  This was due in large part to the enactment in 2001 of an 
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Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC), 
whose principal purpose was to achieve greater political stability by 
strengthening political parties and stopping the common practice of MPs 
‘hopping’ from one party to another, and parties shifting from one coalition to 
another, to gain political (and material) advantage.  Somare was re-elected 
prime minister in 2007, as head of another coalition government dominated 
by his National Alliance party.  Commodore Ilau served as Commander of 
the PNGDF for the greater part of this period, becoming the PNGDF’s 
longest serving commander.  Under Ilau’s command the PNGDF underwent 
a significant downsizing, from 3,700 to 2,000 personnel, and the beginnings 
of a revitalisation, with the first in-country commissioning course conducted 
at the Defence Academy in Lae in 2004-2006.
38
  
In 2003 PNGDF troops were deployed to Solomon Islands as part of the 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI); the PNGDF 
continued to support the RAMSI operation for the next decade.  Legislation 
passed in 2010 paved the way for PNGDF participation in UN peace-keeping 
operations (there are currently PNGDF personnel serving as UN military 
observers in Sudan and South Sudan).  The PNGDF also found itself once 
again involved in a number of internal security operations, including 
operations as part of a Southern Highlands State of Emergency and Special 
Police Operations in 2006-2007, providing security for the 2007 national 
election, and disaster relief operations and civic action including the 
beginning of construction of a road from Baiyer River in the Western 
Highlands to Madang.
39
  
The 2007 national election security operations saw officers who had 
graduated from the first in-country commissioning course take on their first 
operational command.  As a group they were determined to demonstrate 
their capability, against criticism regularly directed towards them by senior 
officers who received training in Australia.  This group of young officers, 
most of whom are educated to tertiary level, see themselves as having a 
sense of corporate identity free of the regional divisions which have affected 
the rest of the officer corps over the past two to three decades.   
The PNGDF in the Political Impasse of 2011-2012 
In early 2010, the Supreme Court handed down a decision on a challenge to 
the OLIPPAC, which ruled that several sections of the OLIPPAC were 
unconstitutional—in particular the provisions restricting MPs from changing 
their allegiances in parliament.  This decision opened the way for a return to 
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the party hopping and ‘yo-yo politics’ which had characterised parliamentary 
behaviour before 2001.   
In August 2011, with Prime Minister Somare on extended leave in 
Singapore, where he was receiving medical treatment, parliament declared 
that the prime ministership was vacant and elected Peter O’Neill, former 
finance minister in the Somare Government, as the new prime minister.  
About half of Somare’s National Alliance crossed the floor to vote for O’Neill.  
Former PNGDF officer Belden Namah became deputy prime minister.  
Somare’s supporters promptly challenged O’Neill’s election and in December 
2011 the Supreme Court handed down a majority decision against the 
National Parliament’s actions.
40
  O’Neill, citing his parliamentary majority, 
chose to ignore the Supreme Court decision.  There followed a period of 
impasse, with two claimant prime ministers, and for a time two governors 
general, and two police commissioners.  With public support and the 
allegiance of MPs, police, and senior public servants apparently flowing to 
O’Neill, Somare appealed to the PNGDF commander, Brigadier-General 
Agwi (who had been appointed by the Somare Government) to uphold the 
constitution.  Agwi however declined to become involved in what he rightly 
saw as a civil issue, effectively lending weight to O’Neill (though sources 
within the PNGDF insisted that the military was neutral, being “pro-
constitution and pro-flag”).
41
   
In January 2012, Somare announced that his government had appointed a 
new PNGDF commander, Colonel Yaura Sasa.  Sasa had recently returned 
from an extended posting as military attaché to Indonesia and, according to 
reports, had been retrenched.  Together with a group of about thirty armed 
soldiers, Sasa seized control of Taurama and Murray Barracks, placing the 
commanding officer at Taurama, Brigadier General Agwi and two other 
senior officers under house arrest, and calling for the reinstatement of 
Somare within seven days.  Sasa denied he was leading a mutiny or military 
takeover; “My task”, he declared, “is restoring the integrity and respect of the 
constitution and the judiciary”.
42
 
Sasa failed to gain support from the officer corps, and by the end of the day 
he and most of his group had been detained or had withdrawn.  Sasa was 
arrested and charged with inciting a mutiny (and later released on bail), but 
claimed he had been acting on the orders of the (Somare) government; 
Somare and his defence minister continued to argue that Sasa had been 
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appointed by their government and had done no wrong.  Namah, appointed 
by O’Neill as acting defence minister, declared a general amnesty for the 
other ranks involved.  In doing so he made reference to his own experience 
of serving over six years in gaol for his role in the Sandline Affair.  Sources 
within the PNGDF have since claimed that the soldiers involved in the mutiny 
were initially paid by the Somare camp and that as part of the general 
amnesty were again paid by the O’Neill Government to hand in their 
weapons—weapons which, it was reported, did not come from the PNGDF 
armouries.
43
   
The impasse was eventually broken by a scheduled national election in June 
2012—despite attempts by Namah to postpone the election.  The PNGDF 
again assisted police in providing security for the election.  O’Neill emerged 
as the leader of the party with the greatest number of seats, and was duly 
elected by parliament as prime minister.  Somare, who before the election 
said he would put the architects of the August 2011 ‘political coup’ behind 
bars if elected, surprisingly joined the O’Neill coalition, and after a falling-out 
with O’Neill, Namah became leader of the opposition. 
Following a period of relative stability, the events of January 2012 have 
revived divisions within the PNGDF.  In private, many in the force have been 
particularly critical of the part played by Namah, accusing him of using the 
PNGDF as his personal praetorian guard and usurping the role of the 
defence minister in the de facto government of 2011-2012.  Although in 
opposition after the 2012 election, Namah has maintained close relations 
with elements within the PNGDF. 
In 2013 a new Defence White Paper—the first since 1999—noted that 
PNG’s defence capabilities had “degenerated significantly” and that the 
country faced challenges which are “complex, non-traditional and 
predominantly developmental in nature”.  It recommended an ambitious 
program for an expanded, reorganised and better-equipped force, including 
a Reserve Force, and placed emphasis on the PNGDF’s role in supporting 
national development.
44
   
Why No Coup? 
In 1977 Joseph LaPolombara wrote, “Military coups are now so frequent and 
widespread they must be considered as significant as elections”.
45
  Earlier, 
Morris Janowitz had suggested that 
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The intervention of the military in the domestic politics [of non-Western 
states] is the norm; persistent patterns of civil supremacy are the deviant 
cases that require special exploration.
46
 
And yet despite a history of recurring civil-military tensions, and the 
continuing unpredictability of its politics, PNG has managed to confound 
early predictions by remaining ‘coup-less’.  As noted at the start of this 
article, observers of PNG in the early 1970s clearly foresaw the possibility of 
a military coup, or at least of some form of military intervention in 
government.  This brief overview of civil-military relations in PNG shows that 
there have been persistent confrontations between civil and military 
personnel since the early years of independence, primarily over service 
conditions, corporate military identity and perceptions of the role of the 
military (including ‘political interference’ in what the PNGDF saw as military 
operations in Bougainville), and ‘defence of the constitution’ against 
corruption or political excess—the classic range of factors underlying military 
coups the world over.  What is interesting about the PNG case is that in a 
series of demonstrations, mutinies and even political interventions, none has 
progressed to a full-scale coup as experienced in much of Africa, Asia and, 
closer to home, Fiji.  How does one explain this ‘deviant case’? 
It might be tempting to argue that the concepts of civilian supremacy and 
military professionalism instilled during the Australian administration and the 
early years of independence militated against a coup.  Certainly the 
behaviour of General Singirok and Major Enuma during the Sandline Affair, 
both in the way demands were channelled and control of angry troops and 
civilian demonstrators was maintained, showed a high degree of 
professionalism, and prevented the incident from becoming something more 
serious.  And in April 2001, in what some described as an ‘attempted coup’ 
but was essentially industrial action over working conditions, soldiers 
remained in their barracks despite the urgings of some politicians and civilian 
protesters.  More recently, Brigadier-General Agwi was firm in his refusal to 
have the PNGDF become involved in the confrontation between Somare and 
O’Neill, and the force was quick to reject the efforts of Colonel Sasa to take 
control of the PNGDF.  But in other instances that professionalism has been 
lacking. 
The fact that a number of military officers have left the Defence Force to 
contest elections for the National Parliament—two (Diro and Namah) serving 
as deputy prime minister and several becoming ministers—has perhaps 
provided something of a safety valve for military men frustrated at the 
limitations placed on them as soldiers.  But there has been no easy road 
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from the barracks to the parliament, so again this does not explain the 
absence of a coup. 
Suggeested ‘explanations’ for the absence of a coup have been the small 
size of the PNGDF (which having been reduced to about 2,000 by 2009 had 
grown back to 2,600 in 2013), split between three barracks, a small Air 
Transport Wing and a Maritime Operations Element in Port Moresby, 
barracks in Lae and Wewak, and smaller units in Kiunga, Vanimo and 
Manus, and its poor logistical capabilities, with aircraft and maritime craft out 
of commission for long periods.  Given the localised, competitive and 
fractious nature of political power in PNG and the difficulties which even a 
legitimate government has in governing, it is difficult to envisage how a small 
military could achieve more than a temporary and geographically limited 
takeover of government.
47
  However, the announcement by Prime Minister 
O’Neill in 2012 that the PNGDF is to be increased to 5,000 by 2015 and 
15,000 by 2030 (a policy amended in the 2013 Defence White Paper to 
5,000 by 2017 and 10,000 by 2030, but still viewed with some scepticism by 
many observers) belies the suggestion that the PNGDF has been kept small 
as a deliberate strategy to inhibit a coup.
48
  
Longstanding antipathy between the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary 
and the PNGDF—evident at the start of the Sandline Affair—might also 
inhibit any propensity towards coups. 
Finally, a perception, at independence, of the PNGDF as a cohesive ‘super-
tribe’ has dissipated over the years.  It was clear that divisions—along 
‘ethnic’/regional lines (Papua/Momase/Highlands/Islands) and around 
individual personalities—existed within the Defence Force at the time of the 
Sandline Affair, and the events of 1997 exacerbated these divisions.  
Although this may have changed among younger officers in recent years, it 
seems likely that only a serious threat to the corporate identity of the PNGDF 
could generate the cohesion necessary for an effective challenge to the 
government.   
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Having said this, a possibility remains of collaboration between opportunistic 
politicians and disgruntled soldiers challenging government in order to 
achieve different political outcomes.  The politicisation of senior PNGDF 
personnel, which was evident in the 1980s and 1990s and again since the 
January 2012 mutiny,
49
 tends to undermine military professionalism and 
make such collaboration more likely.   
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